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Human capital and effective development

KEYWORDS

- human capital;
- quality of human capital;
- effective economic development;
- competitiveness;
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ABSTRACT

Introduction. The relevance of the study is associated with the emerging tendency to overcome the purely "cost" approaches in economic science. Specialists raise the question of revising the existing methods for assessing human capital, the need to reckon with the capital of culture, cultural and moral capital.

Methods. The research methodology was a set of approaches and methods for studying human capital: a historical approach, factor and comparative analysis.

Results and discussion. The article examines the quality of human capital at two levels of its management and development, i.e. the "highest" and "grassroots": at the level of ordinary workers and entrepreneurs, firms and enterprises, and at the level that defines for them the "rules of the game", i.e. the elite. Attention is drawn to the cultural and historical specifics of the study of the phenomenon, affecting current activities. The author traces the tendency to overcome purely "cost" approaches in economic science, as part of the "trend", raises the question of revising existing methods for assessing human capital, the need to reckon with cultural capital, cultural and moral capital.

Conclusions. The transition to an innovative development path is impossible without the involvement of human capital, the development of which will enhance the country's competitiveness and ensure economic development

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INTRODUCTION

The formation, qualities of human capital, is one of the most popular and significant scientific and practical problems, the development of which directly depends on effective development. In economic science, it seems, a turn has begun towards what seems obvious: an institutional approach is not enough, no matter how broad it is, a so-called "cultural-mental" approach is also needed. This theme is convincingly written, for example, by representatives of the Dutch School of Economics S. Begelsdeyk and R. Maseland [3].

For Russia, this result of decades of searching and discussion is also significant because the change of development paradigm at the end of the 20th century was mostly under the pressure of ideas according to which the Russian mentality and values of a market economy are poorly compatible, so the mentality must be changed. It has been argued that there is a fundamental and only Western economic model that has justified itself. Moreover, cultural and country differences in ensuring effective economic development are fading into the background in the context of globalization, informatization and other features of our time. However, the changes taking place in science today cannot but lead to the same thing in politics, in its intellectual and personnel support, including in matters of the formation of human capital.

MATERIALS AND RESEARCH METHODS

The historical approach allows considering the genesis of the studied process or phenomenon in the historical aspect. Factor analysis makes it possible to closely address such factors of the historical process as demographic, technological and geographical.

A comparative analysis made it possible to compare the studied processes and phenomena, which expanded the possibilities of understanding and describing human capital in accordance with the existing reality, concepts and goals of effective development.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Understanding of many contemporary problems is often promoted by their kind of "historical examination". At the same time, the vast majority of what was said about what happened and is happening "with us" and "they" have, in my opinion, a remarkable: in the methodology of the classic – M. Weber was underestimated, oddly enough, the fact that, in addition to everything. He essentially proposed to consider the motives and quality of actions at two levels of management and development of human capital – "higher" and "grassroots". At the level of ordinary workers and entrepreneurs, firms and enterprises, and at the level that defines for them the "rules of the game" – the elite, floors of power. It will be permissible

to recall that an outstanding scientist proceeded from the fact that a person, as a child of a particular culture, "considers universal historical problems from a completely certain point of view". He emphasized the importance of upbringing, "which was determined by the religious atmosphere of the homeland and family", for "choosing a profession and further direction of professional activity"; He wrote about the "sustainable internal identity of every religion" and the opposition to the "spirit" of Protestant traditionalism. Moreover, in the end, with the statement "The capitalist economy no longer needs the sanction of one or another religious doctrine...", and the "World View" is now, as a rule, determined by the interests of trade or social policy." There is a "Transformation of politics into an" enterprise ", which requires skills in the struggle for power" [21].

Each country (to a greater or lesser extent) has its own cultural and historical specifics that affect current activities. Of particular importance in the formation of this specificity are the key turns of history, their consequences. We can distinguish two turning points – the Peter's reforms and the October Revolution of 1917. There are judgments according to which these were breaks in history, and they were led to a tendency to extremes, dominant in Russian culture, and our lack of a middle culture. Among these conclusions, there are allegations that in the Petrine era "Russia had to abandon the sensual Russian-Orthodox worldview and take the path of rational perception of the world" [20, p. 255]. The external habit of this thesis is more, however, unobvious. It draws much of their traditional interpretation of Weber's views on the role of Protestant ethics in establishing the market. However, if we turn to history, we must bear in mind that the reformation, anti-Catholic movements and other movements took place in different countries in Europe, and Protestant ethics took different shades. There is only the "apparent unity of Protestantism" associated with the "uncritical use" of the term itself [14].

Moreover, modern science states that "so far there is no convincing empirical evidence for the thesis that entrepreneurial culture explains national or regional differences in the level of entrepreneurial activity"; "There is also no convincing evidence of a fundamental empirical connection between entrepreneurial culture and economic growth" [3, p. 215]. However, in this context, one should consider not only the usual opposition "Russia – the West", but also the "double standards" of a different kind that are poorly covered in the literature (at least, in the domestic one). The mentioned Dutch researchers of actual problems of economic science note, for example, that "it may be useful to consider the literature on law and finance as a product of a specific culture: attacks on France have long become a characteristic feature of British and American culture (and vice versa). As a result of this, any typology that places France and the USA at the same end of the scale, contrasting them with Great Britain, will be rejected as unconvincing" [3, p. 343]. Of course, the level of tension in the noted oppositions is different; however, not to see their presence, especially it would be wrong.

From the standpoint of philosophy, the philosophy of culture, it is essential that "every concept is based on historical and cultural soil, which belongs not only to it but also to many other concepts... Separate rationalities do not exist as monads... they are characterized by a multitude of interweaving with other rationalities. This fact means that there are not only many

types of rationality, but also a wide range of transitions between them, which, in turn, has a high degree of differentiation" [7, p. 414]. Without such a vision, various politicians that have taken shape in history appear at best as sketches for writing history and describing modernity.

Therefore, it should be assumed that, firstly, there is a non-vanishing cultural-country specificity of the application to the realities of even the basic tenets of unshakable theories. Secondly, domestic and foreign policy, economy and culture, interethnic, interreligious relations, i.e., different areas of the national state and public life permeate different types of rational and irrational.

Different types exist in different countries, especially in a country like Russia. Moreover, they exist in various combinations. Finally, globalization and information technologies "blur the boundaries" between local civilizations. However, they do not negate the fact that various cultural-mental, national subjects of history implement in their way the general civilization field of modernity.

In the cultural-historical context, the faults of Russian history should also be considered. In assessments of Peter's reforms, in exaggerating the significance of the poetic formula of genius about a "hacked window to Europe", the sources of concepts about the cultural isolation of Russia-Russia, the lack of unity of our history. Moreover, the department of progress prescribes any increase in attention to foreign experience in them, and the appeal to traditions is called a reversal. The fact, however, is that Russia has never been a culturally autonomous country, being a part of the Christian world. Europe and Russia inherited antiquity through different parts of the great Roman Empire. Of course, the differences in church-religious dogma that deepened after the split of Christianity influenced both politics and culture. The well-known separation of Russia from the European world was aggravated in the XIII–XV centuries. Horde conquest and even led to isolation. The reforms of Peter I gave a new impetus to relations between Russia and Europe; however, they were mainly a continuation of the policies of his predecessors. It is a continuation, but with a larger-scale than ever, appeal to the European experience. There was a deliberate borrowing of political and economic ideas, traditions in the organization of education and science, stylistics and new trends in art and other processes. There was a complex process of combining traditions and innovations in culture, which often had a contradictory character with the rise of either influences or traditional and even archaic principles, which resulted in the formation of a huge empire with a distinctive culture. P. N. Milyukov in the unsurpassed and still multivolume work "Essays on the History of Russian Culture", created a picture of the natural centuries-old cultural and historical path of Russia-Russia, as the history of the development of culture in the broad sense and all its clusters.

Moreover, he focused not only on the most famous, better visible but also on the internal laws of existence inherent in the culture. Moreover, V. O. Klyuchevsky characterized the radical Peter's transformations, wrote follows: this is a reform that "was not a revolution in its goals and results, but only in its methods and impression, which made on the minds and nerves of contemporaries" [13, p. 202].

The revolution of the 17th year is the only conscious attempt in the history of Russia to "break off" the course of historical and cultural development, to create something unprecedentedly new. It was in its pure form a social experiment with attempts to abandon traditions, national experience. While the Peter's era was created by individuals who acted in full accordance with the general historical and sociological regularity deduced by P. A. Sorokin: "Many forms of human behaviour in by their very nature they exclude intentional motivation in the face of the future and suggest motivation coming from past experience" [19, p. 198]. The Soviet project was implemented based on the primacy of utopian ideas about the future. It was motivated by the future, although, faced with insurmountable problems, politicians tried to land him, referring to both the experience of the past and the realities of the present. What ultimately happened is known. The present of Russia testifies: the cultural and mental foundations of national development turned out to be more stable than the Bolsheviks had expected and were not unsuccessful in overcoming the difficulties accompanying the current fundamental reforms. It can be argued: in a sense, the construction of the building of the new Russia is in many ways a restoration of the pre-revolutionary. Of course, given the fact that the time is different and the experience behind is extraordinary. This construction is not akin to new construction in its purest form but to reconstruction. This process is precisely the name of the construction of the "new" Cathedral of Christ the Savior – it is recreated.

In addition to questions about the isolation of Russia, the exaggeration of its features, the discontinuity of the domestic cultural and historical process, statements about the absence of a middle ground in Russian culture, and therefore rationalism, deserve special attention. Perhaps N. A. Berdyaev formulated the first and most vividly this idea. He argued that Russia differs from the West in that "it does not have the gift of creating a secondary culture... The Russians are characterized by some kind of powerlessness, some mediocrity in everything relative and average. However, the history of culture and the public is all, in fact, average and relative; she is not absolute. Since the kingdom of God is the kingdom of the absolute and the finite, the Russian people easily give up everything relative and average to the power of the kingdom of the devil", "the Russian spirit longs for absolute Divine freedom. Therefore... it is difficult for the Russians to create a relative culture, which is always the last but one thing, not the last. Russians are always in slavery in the middle and relative and justify this by the fact that in the final and absolute, they are free" [4, p. 25–26]. However, these conclusions become part of Berdyaev's holistic conception only when they are considered in unity with his ideas about the role of religion and culture in the cultural and historical process: "Culture is always proud of the antiquity of its origin, inextricable connection with the great past. Moreover, the culture honours a special kind of grace of the priesthood. Culture, like the Church, cherishes its continuity more than anything else ... In culture, there is an eternal struggle of eternity with time ... a culture in which there is religious depth always strives for resurrection" [5, p. 249]. At the same time, the "successors" of the line of the outstanding philosopher, depriving it of spiritual, religious foundations, ultimately cultural ties, come to the utmost sociological, to the schematic. One can even meet the assertion that Russia is an

"inorganic civilizational type", and the inability to get out of contradictions under, for example, the baselessness of the intelligentsia, lame decisions, leads to "disorganization of reproductive activity, growth of social entropy". Moreover, the conclusion: "In fact, there is a sociocultural pathology that requires a diagnosis and treatment" [1, p. 772, 781]. However, it seems logical, does not answer fundamental questions. For example, such: how could such a culture, "sociocultural pathology" create and develop civilization, being inorganic, even anomalous, for many centuries, preserve vast spaces and wealth, successfully resist organic civilizations, including frequent and large-scale military clashes? Is it possible to consider - despite all our troubles, falls and other calamities, that by global standards Russia has developed poorly, unsuccessfully? Moreover, what are the limits of the subjectivity of the elites, if we focus on the characteristics of our intelligentsia? The search for answers should be sought not in the usual patterns and ideologies that have long been unable to escape from the vicious circle of questions, do not lead to convincing conclusions, but in other, not traditional philosophical proposals. So, Yu. M. Lotman, comprehending the depths of classical Russian literature (and not only Russian), wrote, "Russian culture is characteristic and understood not only by its binary but also by its ternary." In his opinion, what is needed is not the search for a third special way, but the imposition on the Christian binary of "popular representations of the pagan type, justifying, accepting the world." This world is the "world of good, the world of evil and the world of ordinary life." As S. P. Zalygin precisely formulated politics: any ideas must be "pacified" by the experience and culture of the people, "brought to a common denominator" of national life [6, p. 405–422]. Attention should be paid to the fact that our elites (different, changing each other) are often really marked by one common quality – they create, in the words of O. Mandelstam, "without feeling the country". One must understand by "not feeling", "not knowing" adherence to theories and ideas without their conjugation with realities, with reality. At the same time, it is more accurate to write about creativity (reformatory or revolutionary), the transformative activity of not the intelligentsia, but the elites. The latter also have, and sometimes, perhaps, intelligentsia predominates. However, the ruling elites do not include all intelligentsia and not all its groups, movements, directions suffer from the same groundlessness or administrative futility.

A factorial analysis of history seems to be promising with a careful and balanced appeal to what concerns our peculiar European character, to the peculiarities of Russian Orthodox culture in the bosom of Christianity, to the historically developed multinational and multiconfessional of Russia. S. A. Nefedov, for example, successively following this method, attaches particular importance to such factors of the historical process as demographic, technological and geographical. According to him, in the course of modernization, westernization (especially after Peter) in Russia it was not "just the adoption of individual Western institutional and technical innovations; in the process of this adoption, a synthesis of introduced and traditional elements took place" [15, p. 28]. However, referring to the issues under discussion, one should finally decide on "what is traditional?". It seems that V. B. Zemskov is right: "Culture, mentality, consciousness at every moment of their historical being keep all layers of the original and later created "ready" for action: archaic, traditional, modern. Moreover, all three components

appear in multilateral and diverse cross-relations, depending on development options. This relationship is not only opposition but also cooperation. The middle member of the triad – the traditional – is once modern, arising from archaic in interaction with innovations and becoming the middle normativity, "holding" the system" [22, p. 223–224]. I must emphasize, I believe that the mid-normative traditional is a conditional cultural, value "median"; this is what exists as a dominant, "holding" the system, representing a certain "core" of the cultural-value system, which has established itself in this capacity at this stage of the cultural-historical process. The median is not in the "balance" in content but the place of position in the triad. This image is a well-established, acquired the status of the traditional, understood as a cultural-value image, a characteristic of society, civilization in its present. That is, the traditional is not the past, but the present with projections into history and the future, it is a balance that "does not accept" and archaize, immutability, ossification, and instability created by "artificial" aspirations for modernization for the sake of modernization, for changes under inorganic foreign cultural pressure. The traditional is being, but traditionalism and anti-traditionalism are ideological.

The contrast between traditional and liberal values that is widespread among us does not include life. It is vital that following the historian of Russian liberalism V. V. Leontovich, A. I. Solzhenitsyn rightly emphasized: "liberalism is alive only as long as it adheres to the evolutionary transformation of existing structures." It is extremely dangerous both when radicalism is mistaken for liberalism and when "other possible breakdowns of liberalism are triggered: towards democratic absolutism and imperialist democracy" [18]. In Russia, various groups of elites, lining up according to tradition "under the banners" of the indicated trends, create a confrontation between two large political camps. In one, elites infected with both real and imposed Europeanism, Westernized inferiority, in the other – pro-Russian, pro-Russian insufficiency, again, both real and artificially cultivated to gain "their place in the sun".

Russia has its predetermined path, but it is impossible, on the one hand, to absolutize its originality, and on the other, to privatize its special development. A unique way is not only with us. Also, this is not the third vector, the path of development between the West and the East" (you can put – North and South). The world of our time pushes more convincing into the background habitual and seemingly eternal schemes and argues that in history and the future, every somehow significant state-country, cultural-civilizational formation is individual. It/they are on a unique path because they are strong enough to face others in a different capacity. There is an inorganic, unnatural, destructive desire for civilizational and cultural uniformity. The fate of the communist project and modern programs of «democratic» dominance prove this fact.

Ultimately, all the issues raised and related issues address the topic of competitiveness. There are the competitiveness of states, national-state entities and, to a large extent, of nations (no matter how sensitive this issue maybe), the competitiveness of elites (political, economic and other types of elites) and labour resources. Moreover, here such circumstance draws attention. There is dominant research and, later, administrative and managerial approaches that are deprived of self-criticism. They led to the formation of a "separation" of methodologies,

and then, of course, of analysis methods and interpretations of what managers and executors are in the national system of functioning of the economy, politics, and other spheres of public and state life. The elites, mainly on their tops, are "guided by the telescope" of humanitarian knowledge, most often purely political science, and labour resources, groups that provide professional and production activities and management at the middle and lower levels, are "examined under the microscope" of vocational and other social statistical and sociological meters. The second layer, level, as a rule, also falls under the concept of "human capital", assessed according to "technological", "instrumental" criteria and checked against them for effectiveness. However, with one fundamental caveat: when "contingencies" arise when it is not easy to explain why the quality of human capital does not lead to the efficiency set by the "researchers", "correction factors" are often included, which are often "explanations" of the whole mentality. In our case, this is a discussion about the eternal Russian, Russian inability to rationally think and act, about the notorious "shovels" when referring to the Soviet, and even the current periods of development. It should be noted that the concept of "homo soveticus" became most widespread after the publication of the novel of the same name by A. A. Zinoviev, who, we must not forget, belongs to the hard and precise aphorism formulated later: "They aimed at communism, but ended up in Russia". It will also be worthwhile to recall that a close, similar concept was introduced back in 1918 by the remarkable philosopher and theologian S. N. Bulgakov, speaking of attempts to create a "homo socialisticus".

It is gratifying that both the methodological "absurdity" and the politicization, ideologization of professional issues, apparently, nevertheless begin to be overcome, the corresponding conceptual scientific proposals appear. In the discussion materials of one of the International Scientific Conferences, for example, questions were raised about what national elites are, what is their essence, how do they influence the state's domestic and foreign policy, including the problems of forming approaches to macro- and microeconomics, education policy, health care. Moreover, this directly affects the quality and development of human capital in a narrow, familiar sense. Noting these points, Yu. M. Osipov rightly emphasizes: "In the modern complex and hierarchically structured civilizational society, which consists of many diverse societies (sub- or subsociums), there is also an equally complex and hierarchically structured elitist structure – the social system of various elites: from local and special (specialized) to general and complex (integral), and most importantly, from power, central and higher to subservient, local and lower... If we choose something specific as an assessment of the elite from the past, then we are guided by the fact is not that we are talking about the past, but that we consider some elements to be the best, wise, effective. Hence the orientation toward those historical eras and those representatives of the elite whose activities in the past ultimately brought positive results for the country, the people... Even despite various kinds of "deviations" – cruelty, rudeness, Machiavellianism... However, fuss There is a situation when the "innovators" turn out to be conservatives, because, contrary to evidence, they become the creators of a new utopia... Morality, reason, dedication and love for the homeland have always been and remain the criterion for entering the power elite... However, due to the increasing financial factor in

modern "Economic civilization"..., the criterion for selecting the elite is money. They began to replace everything... In this regard, a new approach to joining the elite is approved, without any traditions and prejudices" [17, p. 11, 24–25].

The criteria are "listed" correctly. At the same time, firstly, we must insist that when considering history not as a political or some other "private", but as a cultural-historical process, the risk of subjectivization and modernization of some aspects of the past is significantly reduced. Secondly, there is no reason to idealize both antiquity and the recent past. A "business" approach has always been present. Another thing is that today in the "business", apparently, the very content of the latter is changing. Finances, perhaps, are becoming more significant than, for example, nepotism, although they got it first of all, and now everything is there.

In this regard, criticism of the state and bureaucracy from various positions deserves attention, including, concentrating on the fact that the free market in the classical liberal sense does not exist (at least not today). So, professor of the London School of Economics D. Graber, noting this, writes mainly about the replacement of elites in their general understanding by bureaucracy. He argues: the liberal policy of "reducing the role of government" in the economy "did not work," "English liberalism, for example, did not lead to a decrease in the share of the state bureaucracy, but exactly the opposite result," to "increase the total amount of regulation, the total amount of paperwork the total number of bureaucrats". Contrary to the dreams of liberals, literally "a real cultural transformation" has taken place, a particular "culture of complicity" is being created, encompassing education, science, the media, corporate and family ties, ensuring the existence of bureaucracy and career growth. "When historians begin to compose the epitaph of neoliberalism, they will have to write that it was a form of capitalism that systematically gave priority to political imperatives over economic ones" [8]. This kind, at some points approaching imperative judgments, must be comprehended, without forgetting about the problematic history of liberalism in Russia, the features of our statehood, including the peculiarities of the Russian bureaucracy.

Moreover, some proposals, ideas that require differently posed questions are not only theoretical but also quite practical. W. Beck precedes his famous work, "The Society of Art Nouveau: On the Road to Another Art Nouveau," meaningfully. He writes that in modern conditions a new, different "social reality" has formed, and "It is more reminiscent of the fate of the estates in the Middle Ages than the class situations of the 19th century. In any case, it no longer recognizes class inequality (as it does not recognize border groups, differences between a city and a village, national or ethnic affiliation). Unlike class and class situations, it develops not under the sign of poverty, but under the sign of fear and is not a "traditional relic", but a product of Art Nouveau at the highest stage of its development... (All this) carries threats that transform what is brought in the modern world to the extreme, individualism in its extreme opposite" [2, p. 1–2]. Of course, one should not "shy from one extreme to the other", oblivion or underestimate traditional social differences, factors. At the same time, one should take seriously the idea of an emerging or already existing new social reality. Moreover, to speak, however, it is nevertheless necessary, not about the disappearance of sociality, but the acquisition by it of new qualities.

Without attention to the features of the new reality, and, therefore, to the distinguishing features of modern generations, to build and implement projects, programs for the formation of the personnel of organizations, enterprises, and collectives is not reasonable, not productive. Moreover, this is of particular importance when addressing in theory and practice to the problems of the development of human capital in special, including close to extreme conditions – the same Far North. Experts rightly pay attention to this [16, p. 8–13]. These plots acquire an individual sound and significance during the current stage of Arctic exploration with expanding and incomparable international participation and cooperation, which is incomparable with previous times. Both on international cooperative principles, and in strengthening the inevitable interstate interaction in the implementation of national Arctic programs.

Moreover, this is associated with the need to increase attention to the national, ethnic, socio-psychological characteristics of various social, socio-professional groups. Furthermore, determining the Arctic programs of the elites, and those from whose environment "labour collectives" are formed, and, naturally, their leaders. Inattention to the quality of the representatives of the first managerial level, that is, the elites, looks at least short-sighted. What has already been said in principle, especially when it comes to developing policies and implementing large-scale programs related to the participation of particularly vulnerable groups of the population? In this case, the small peoples of the North. These are delicate questions in their way when implementing projects that involve often "non-traditional" cultural and historical neighbours participating in joint work in particular conditions. Joint activity is inevitable, and it concerns both state collectives (the same military and border formations) and private ones.

Nevertheless, be that as it may, the new twists and turns noted cannot but be based on the fundamental classical ideas that have been tested by the time about the necessary "minimum" of data for understanding the situation and possible directions, the results of its development. "Without knowledge of the society and culture in which a given individual is born and grows, no personal traits of his – beliefs, ideas, beliefs, tastes, addictions, and that which causes hostility – cannot be understood; all his mentality, manners and customs, his style of behaviour and lifestyle are completely incomprehensible. Not only the psychosocial personality as a whole but also many of its biological qualities are moulded and determined by the space in which it grows" [19, p. 185–186]. Such ideas require constant philosophical, socio-philosophical and cultural-philosophical reflection in both scientific and practical activities. The question should be raised about the urgent need to derive a humanitarian examination of various modern practices "from captivity" of individual "monoscientific" preferences. Modernity, reality compels us to think and act differently, including by returning culture to its proper place: "... at the beginning of the twentieth century, the evolution of the concept of "culture" led to its splitting into two different meanings: "cultural" and "cultivated", and the established boundaries between economic science, sociology, history and anthropology led to the disappearance of culture from economic thought. Culture began to be understood as

something opposite to the object of economic research. While economic science began to study everything universal, normal and rational, "culture" developed into a concept denoting specific varieties, irrational deviations from the standard economic model. To the extent that culture continued to be found in economic thought, it was usually on the periphery of analysis. They resorted to culture to study the marginal features of human behaviour, which could not be explained in any way within the framework of the (limited) rational behaviour of actors, or to study behaviour in general in marginal countries that are lagging in development" [3, p. 76]. Once the "rationalists" won. Now we have to unqualify, interpreting in a new way, this is an innocent, obviously overly overloaded concept.

CONCLUSION

Recently, there has been a tendency to overcome purely "cost" approaches in economic science, as part of the just noted "trend". So, in the Report of the Higher School of Economics, in the chapter on the leading role of culture in the formation of human capital, it is stated that "indicators of the cultural sphere are not directly included in the calculation of indices of both human development and human capital and human potential" [9, p. 62, 68]. Specialists persistently raise the question of revising the existing methods for assessing human capital, the need to reckon with the capital of Culture, Cultural and moral capital. The presence of thin "emotional-mental layers" in the "building material of human activity" is rightly noted. It is proposed at all levels at which factors of competitiveness of human capital are considered to highlight cultural factors. Not excluding, without going around the mega-level at which the objects of research "are economic unions of states, individual continents and regions of the world", which also work "values, moral qualities, linguistic and cultural competence of a person, cultural and ethnic characteristics, psychological characteristics" [10; 11; 12]. However, all this essential humanitarian, cultural and mental set must be considered concerning individual states, to their interaction. Moreover, it should be emphasized once again: it is necessary to measure, check for professional suitability and those who at the "highest level" determine the policy of formation, reproduction, development of human capital, both the most important factor in effective development and those who "realize the lowest level" in human capital potential.

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